ONHOUDBARE SCHULDEN TE LIJF

Wie moet betalen voor de schuld van IJsland?

Datum: 15-03-2010

Jubilee Nederland heeft samen met Europese partnerorganisaties een beleidsbrief opgesteld over de Icesave zaak en de parallelen die zijn te trekken met de internationale schuldenproblematiek. Tevens wordt ingegaan op de oplossingen die NGO's daar - ook in het verleden - voor hebben aangedragen.

Who should pay for Iceland’s debt?

15 March 2010

How a fair and transparent debt work-out mechanism could help settle the Icelandic case

On 6 March 2010 the people of Iceland voted on whether and how Icelandic citizens should have to pay back debts claimed by the Netherlands and the UK. The claimed debts relate to the collapse of the Icelandic bank Landsbanki, and its Icesave branch, which held €6.7 billion in deposits from Dutch and British savers. More than 90% of Icelandic voters rejected the repayment plan.

A recent policy brief "Who should pay for Iceland’s debt? How a fair and transparent debt work-out mechanism could help settle the Icelandic case” by Both Ends, Erlassjahr, the Jubilee Debt Campaign, Jubilee Nederland and Eurodad highlights how the Icesave case has brought to the forefront of public debate in Europe key questions that anti-poverty activists have been raising for more than a decade. For instance, 

  • Who should be responsible for sovereign debts and how can they be held accountable? Is it only the borrower? Or does the creditor bear some sort of responsibility? How does this relate to Iceland’s ‘debt’?lt;/div>
  • How should a country’s financial situation affect the terms of repayment of a debt? Should the lender’s claims take priority over the borrower’s chances to rebuild their economy? What power should the holding of debt assign to creditor over debtor?lt;/div>
  • Who should decide on disputed debt claims and terms of repayment? Is there a fair, independent and transparent institutional mechanism which all parties involved regard as legitimate enough to be able to arbitrate?lt;/div>

This policy brief first outlines the course of events in Iceland since the end of 2008, and addresses key questions of the Icelandic case such as: how was the loan contracted; what are the responsibilities of different authorities and governments involved; what mechanisms are being used to settle disagreements over repayment; and how could a fair, independent and transparent debt work-out mechanism help in settling the Icelandic case.

Policy implications

The circumstances under which the loan was provided cannot be regarded as truly responsible. Though there was no obligation for Iceland to accept a loan, pressure was put upon Iceland by the Netherlands and the UK to do so. This pressure continues. But now the people of Iceland have rejected repayment terms, submitting the case to a Court of Arbitration would seem an obvious way of overcoming the impasse and determining whether the loan was contracted legally and what the repayment terms should be taking into account Iceland’s current economic situation.

Using the Civil Society Principles on a Sovereign Debt Work-Out Procedure we will outline some policy implications for Iceland’s overall debt problem, including the Icesave case. There are 6 principles that are salient: 

  1. Creation of a decision making body which is independent of creditors. The sovereign debt work-out procedure must be independent of any creditor institution or body. This is clearly not currently the case for Iceland.
  2. A comprehensive process. While the present Dutch/British initiatives are the expression of privileged creditors trying to secure their part of the cake, the restoration of Iceland’s economic viability needs a comprehensive approach, unimpaired by piecemeal and individual creditor interests.
  3. Legitimacy. Beyond issues of debt sustainability, an independent arbitration panel needs to verify the validity of each individual claim, which is clearly not (yet) proven in the Icesave dispute.
  4. Assessment of the indebted country’s economic situation by a neutral body. Like in a (US) Chapter 9 proceeding, the essential functions of the Icelandic state need to be secured when its payment capacities towards its external creditors are considered. This must necessarily be done by an independent body.
  5. Transparency. The referendum is an impressive act of taking the issue of a country's fiscal and external viability out of the negotiation rooms of treasuries, central banks and private lenders, and submitting it to a transparent democratic process. For the Icelandic government it would be highly advisable to continue to subject any proposed agreement with external creditors to public scrutiny.
  6. Enforceability. All parties must respect the decision of the independent arbitrators.

Anti-poverty campaigners have argued for many years that an arbitration procedure needs to be set up to deal with sovereign debt disputes. Such a mechanism could transform international financing, by ensuring that debt is both responsible and payable. It would transform relations between lender and borrower, creating a basis on which debts could be seen as truly a matter of joint responsibility.

Download hier dit bijbehorende bestand:
Who_should_pay_for_Iceland_s_d

Terug naar overzicht

Delen:

Jubilee tweets > alles bekijken


Jubilee Nederland | P/a Both ENDS | Nieuwe Keizersgracht 45 | 1018 VC Amsterdam
PARTNERS:
Both Ends Een Eurodad Hivos Icco Oxfam Novib
Deze website is mede mogelijk gemaakt door:
X-Interactive internetdiensten